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droit national. Je vous trouve aussi trop rapidement sc!Wre pour Ie vocabulaire 
Jure imperii, jure gestionis, et pour les «actes de nature commerciale • : Ie 
vrai probl~me est peut~tre d'eclairer ce vocabulaire par des c standards • d~ 
ves. Mais de toutes fa~ns, a moins de proceder par assertions dogmatiques, 
nous sommes condamnes a formuler des directives assez souples, que ron 
propose ces directives comme des regles de droit international public, OIl 
comme des regles de droit uniforme. 
Permettez-moi pour Ie moment de ne pas repondre dans Ie detail A votre 
questionnaire; je Ie ferai volontiers un peu plus tard, oralement ou par ecrtL 
Croyez-moi, mon cher Confrere, votre tout devoue 
Paul Reuter 
8. Observations of Mr Sompong Sucharitkul 
2S April 1986 
1. I agree with the Rapporteur that the words .. recent aspects" in the 
mandate of the Commission should be interpreted with a certain liberality with 
sufficient latitude for the Rapporteur to investigate the root causes of all the 
current problems relating to jurisdictional immunities. The Rapporteur should 
have a wide discretion to determine the precise extent of the .. aspects" that 
should be covered in his report whether or not they are still considered to be 
of recent development. 
2. The distinction between immunities ratione personae and immunities 
ratione materiae has served a practical and useful purpose in a special connee> 
tion, in relation to the immunities accorded to representatives of States, 
especially diplomatic representatives of one State accredited to another State 
and personal sovereigns. The distinction has a clear function in determininl 
the types of immunities that survive the mission of the accredited represen-
tatives or personal sovereigns and those that terminate with the end of their 
mandates. The distinction is supported by the practice of States in regard to 
the possibility of actions against ex-diplomats or ex-sovereigns. 
Thus in Leon c. Diaz, Clunet 19 (1892), 1137, a former Minister of Uruguay 
in France was held amenable to the jurisdiction c par la double raison qu. 
Dial. a cessi ses fonctions diplomatiques en France depuis 1889, et qu'il s'agit, 
dans son diffirend avec Leon, d'interlts absolument privu et entiermlmt 
~trangers a ses fonctions de ministre IO. Similarly, in Laperdrix c. Kouzoubotf 
et Belin, Clunet 53 (1926), page 64, an ex-Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Pari. 
was ordered to pay an indemnity for injury caused to two persons in a car 
accident. The action was brought three weeks after the cessation of hit 
diplomatic functions in France in respect of an accident which occurred duriDI 
his mission. The court observed: (at page 6S) 
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«Cons. que Ie principe de l'immunit~ diplomatique ~rig~ dans 
l'interit des gouvernements, et non dans celui des diplomates, ne 
s'etend pas au-dela de la mission; que la these contraire aboutirait 
a creer au profit de l'agent diplomatique une sorte de prescription et 
une i"esponsabilite indetinie. 10 
The practice of other States, such as Swiss (see Clunet 54 [1927], 1175 and 
983-987, and also 1179), British (see Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin 
[1859], 2 E. & E. 94, and Re Suarez, Suarez v. Suarez [1917] 2 Ch. 131, 139, 
[1918] 1 Ch. 176) and American (see District of Columbia v. Paris (1939), Cases 
Nos. 448485-448494, M.S. Dept. St. File 701.9411/1194 regarding an ex-employee of 
the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.A.) also confirms this trend. 
Article 14 of the Resolutions of the Institut de Droit International (1895) and 
Article 20 of the Havana Convention (1928) contain similar provisions. The 
Harvard Draft Convention and the Draft of the Inter-American Institute of 
International Law also contain virtually the same provisions. Article 39 (2) of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, provides: 
.. When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immu-
nities have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall 
normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on 
expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall submit 
until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect 
to the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity 
shall continue to subsist • .. 
Thus immunities accorded to diplomats ratione personae terminate with 
their diplomatic functions, whereas immunities accorded ratione materiae 
continue to subsist, being, as it were, immunities of the States they represent. 
The same distinction applies to acts of personal sovereigns or heads of 
State. Thus, in Empereur Maximilien du Mexique c. Lemaitre, Clunet 1 (1874), 
32, immunity was upheld on the ground that the Emperor was the reigning 
IOvereign in an action relating to the purchase of furniture for the decoration 
of his residence without payment. On the other hand, in Mellerio c. Isabelle 
de Bourbon, Clunet 1 (1874), 33, the court assumed jurisdiction on the grounds: 
(1) that the defendant, formerly Queen of Spain no longer retained that public 
office, and (2) that the order of jewels was for her own personal use (ratione 
personae) and not c pour Ie compte du Tresor IO. The distinction between a 
• prince regnant. and an • ancien sultan,. was maintained in the case of 
Wiercinsky c. Seyyid Ali Ben Hamond, Prince Bashid, ex-Sultan of Zanzibar 
in respect of unpaid personal service of massage rendered by the plaintiff. 
Immunities enjoyed by diplomats and sovereigns ratione personae end with 
the cessation of their official functions, but the immunities accorded to them 
ratione materiae in the exercise of their functions continue to subsist. But the 
continued subsistance of immunities ratione materiae merely signified that they 
SUbsist as State immunities, and are therefore treated as such. Thus in the 
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Iran Embassy case as well as the Philippines Embassy's Bank Account cue, 
the immunities invoked are immunities ratione materiae, the question raised 
concerns the precise extent of such State immunities which may also be 
restricted as in the Italian case of La Mercantile c. Regno di Grecia, Tribunale 
di Roma, 30-1-1955, Rivista di diritto internazionale 38 (1955), pp. 376-378, I.L.lt 
1955, pp. 24().242. 
The . distinction between immunities ratione personae and immunities 
ratione materiae, which is useful in separating acts of representatives of Stalea 
which are protected by States immunities ratione materiae and those which 
are only entitled to a temporary protection during the terms of office, IJ 
without use with regard to acts attributable to the States which are immune 
in any event ratione materiae. Continued reference to the expression might 
confuse jurisdictional immunities rationae materiae, i.e., State immunities with 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and "non-justiceability" of the proceedinp 
under the lex fori. 
The expression immunities in personam is not accurately phrased since It 
is more in contradiction to immunity in rem, while the phrase "ratione mat. 
riae" is to be contrasted with "ratione personae" with the special function of 
distinguishing between acts performed by State representatives on behalf of 
the States in the exercice of official functions and acts performed in their 
individual personal capacity unconnected with any official duty. 
3. This is a fundamental question, meaningful perhaps in the common Jaw 
jurisdictions, where the court may first have to establish the existence of itl 
jurisdiction and then decide whether or not to exercise it. Thus, an English 
or American court would have the discretion to exercise or to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction on several grounds, including those other than State immu-
nity, such for instance, as an act of State, non-justiceability, lack of personal 
jurisdiction, absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, or the existence of a better 
forum conveniens or other grounds recognized in private international law. 
The practice of civil-law jurisdiction may be more compelling with lela 
discretion. Thus, once the court decides that it is «compitente., it cannot 
decline jurisdiction. It has to determine the question submitted to it for 
decision. This is one of the problem areas in which Professor Niboyet hal 
endeavoured to draw a line of distinction between «immuniti de luridicticm» 
which is public international law and c incompitence d'attribution. which IJ 
probably private international law reasoning. 
The answer to question No. 3 therefore depends on the judicial system or 
the court of the country called upon to decide a given case. It cannot be 
stated categorically in advance that the court in general or a particular court 
can or cannot be given a discretion in according or withholding immunity. 
Such a discretion may in tum depend on the judgement or opinion of the 
court regarding the nature of the acts attributable to the foreign State. 
4. The examples given in paragraph 18 provide excellent illustrations ci 
apparent absence of legal basis for jurisdiction or reluctance on the part ci 
municipal courts to examine cases in which under the rules of private iDter'-
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IIIlttonal law they are without jurisdiction or for lack of essential competence, 
or subject-matter jurisdiction or remoteness of territorial connection or other 
IJOWlds of non-justiceability under private or public international law. They 
are to be distinguished from areas where the courts are otherwise competent 
or have a valid ground on which to base jurisdiction under national law but 
refrain from exercising it on grounds of State immunity as required by public 
International law. 
5. The principle of consent has a decisive role in relation to State immunity. 
It is possible to regard the question of State immunity as arising as the result 
of an interplay of a series of presumptions of consent, consent on the part of 
the host State to allow the passage of foreign troops for instance, or consent 
on the part of the sending State for its representatives to be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the territorial courts when instituting legal proceedings in those 
courts. Consent has also been used to determine the possibility or the very 
existence or claimworthiness of State immunity, as immunity presupposes lack 
of consent on the part of the State claiming it. As such, immunity is never 
absolute, but always relative and can be waived by the State at any time or 
any stage of the proceeding. The question whether or not immunity will be 
pnted or withheld in a given case may well depend on the readiness or 
reluctance with which the court will presume or assume or imply the existence 
of consent. On the other hand, immunity may also depend on the rigidity 
or strictness of requirements regarding the procedure of claiming immunity. 
Thus, immunity may be denied or presumed to have been waived, if no one 
bas claimed it, or it may be denied if not properly claimed, such as by someone 
DOt recognized by the court as representing the State concerned. 
Consent may be implied from the conduct of the State, and the readiness 
011 the part of the local law to imply consent may reflect the degree of 
restriction municipal courts are prepared to place on the application of State 
Immunities. It may provide a convenient common ground for a compromise 
to be worked out so as to give satisfaction to the various theories and schools 
01 thought regarding the desirable optimum extent of sustainable jurisdictional 
immunities of States in international relations having regard to the co-existence 
of different ideologies, forms of government and economic structures. 
6. The Commission's task would be incomplete without reference to the 
question of II heads of State and ministers of foreign governments ". Precisely 
how far the Commission should treat various aspects of the immunities 
ICCOrded and enjoyed by heads of States as State organs, and ministers as 
departments of government, is a matter to be carefully examined and accura-
tely measured. There are other questions involved, such as immunities ratione 
personae during the tenure of their office, and immunities ratione materiae 
which survive their official functions, but which are equally subject to whatever 
restrictions that may be adopted to limit the application of State immunities 
par excellence. The question referred to in question No. 6 could be treated 
1IIIder the heading of State organs, departments of government, or agencies 
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and instrumentaUties of States entitled to Immunity. They are included on the 
list of recipients or beneficiaries of State immunities, of which the questioa 
of precise extent should merit the attention of the Commission. 
7 ... Foreign armed forces" can be subsumed under the heading of State 
organs. Their immunities depend on the extent of consent of the receivinl 
State as well as of the sending State. Foreign armed forces constitute organa 
of the foreign States and are treated as such. The practice of States regardilll 
the immunities of visiting foreign forces in time of peace is abundant. While 
the immunities accorded to foreign visiting forces or men of war are subsumed 
under other general categories of State immunities such as State organs, they 
nevertheless deserve special attention. The emphasis in this connection should 
be placed not so much on the granting or denial of immunities, but rather 
on the division or partition or priorities of the exercise of concurrent JuriJ. 
diction. Competition should be properly balanced between the exercise 01 
disciplinary or supervisory military jurisdiction of the visiting forces and due 
process of the local criminal law. In actual practice, there are no hard.and-fut 
rules save the existence of concurrent jurisdiction that must be carefully 
partitioned and adjusted so as to achieve a healthy balance between variOUl 
conflicting interests of the territorial States and the sending States. Several 
bilateral status of forces agreements and regional collective defence treaties 
may provide revealing examples of possible cooperation between the autho-
rities exercising concurrent jurisdiction. But the matter is delicate and susc:epo 
tible of high sensitivity and popular emotion, especially in areas where foreigD 
bases have been established. This is a trans-ideological problem whether ill 
NATO alliance or in Warsaw pact, it has to be handled with extreme cautiaD. 
8. In as much as the extent of immunity may be said to reflect policJ 
considerations regarding the rationale or justification of State immunity, a 
serious attempt to determine the precise scope or limit of immunity must 01 
necessity take into account policy considerations underlying the concept 01 
immunity. If indeed Immunity is a general principle of international Jaw, a 
more fundamental principle is to be found in the concept of sovereignty and 
equality of States on which immunity is based. Yet more basic than s0ve-
reignty is the principle of territoriality to which immunity is but an accepted 
exception. Doctrinal approach varies considerably with the policy considerations, 
especially now the controversy is further complicated by the growing voice 01 
the third world of developing nations. It would be a grave error to overlook 
or underestimate the cries of the overwhelming majority of States simply 
because they were neither European nor Socialist, or because their attitude 
and approach may be basically different from the West or the East. Whatever 
principles of international law to be developed, the courts should take iIlto 
account the relevant interests of all States and the policy considerations of aD 
nations, whose dignity or existence may depend on the general recognition of 
an optimum volume or measure of State immunity. The nature test is bask: 
but not always conclusive. In appropriate instances the purpose test may be 
determinative. 
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9. The formulation of immunity as a general principle is justifiable as long 
u it is recognized that in relation to a more basic concept of territoriality 
or territorial sovereignty, immunity itself is an exception to the more general 
and fundamental rule of jurisdiction of the territorial State. It is on the basis 
of implied waiver of jurisdiction or consent of the territorial State that immu-
nity has come to be regarded as a general rule and in that context can be so 
formulated. Another approach has also been suggested that there are two 
equally valid general rules: one of jurisdiction and another of immunity, and 
that each one constitutes an exception to the other. The exercise of juris-
diction is not infrequent in practice in well-defined areas of non-immunity. 
It might be possible to work out areas of immunity at the same time as areas 
of non-immunity on an equal basis. This approach has not been adopted in 
effect, as State practice as well as codification efforts have started from the 
proposition of immunity being a general rule and non-Immunity in specified 
areas being its acknowledged exceptions. 
10. While the practice of many States such as the United States, Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and to some extent also the 
United Kingdom and France recognize the distinction between acts lure imperii 
IDd acts jure gestionis, the practice of other countries such as Italy, Belgium 
and Egypt probably accepted a more fundamental distinction between the 
public and private character of State acts or between the public and private 
capacity or personality of State. On the other hand, in socialist jurisdictions 
all activities attributable to the State are public. Apart from being objeo-
tionable in the eyes of many legal systems, the distinction is also unsuitable 
u a basis for the development of international law, as it is unworkable in 
practice and admits of considerable loopholes. It may even be considered 
arbitrary and lead to injustices or inconsistent results. 
II. The Rapporteur's" preferred solution" offers an interesting possibility 
ill theory but appears to be far removed from the existing State practice. If 
the Jaw of State immunity is empirical, an inductive approach is to be preferred. 
The Rapporteur's suggestion merits closer attention with regard to the existence 
01 criteria and not the application of a single criterion for determining immu-
nity or non-immunity. None of the illustrations or examples furnished by the 
Rapporteur readily commend themselves to any generally acceptable solutions. 
Indeed, the jurisprudence or case law of several States has come up with 
different answers, different solutions and different results, depending on the 
criteria employed. The two principal distinctions proposed by the Rapporteur 
could be helpful. The first is similar to Professor Niboyet's distinction 
between «immunite de juridiction,. and «incompetence d'attribution,., now 
IDcompetence ration~ materiae or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The 
IeCOnd distinction between the essence of national policies and the normal 
rub of implementation by means of private law transaction may attract some 
IUpport from developing countries if priority is accorded to their national 
JIOlIcies. 
-----
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12.· My " preferred solution" is one based on an inductive approach, 
wherever possible on existing State practice, or on current trends in the PI'llC> 
tice of States. This is possible if acts attributable to States to which legal 
proceedings relate may be classified into specified areas. In each of these 
areas particular attention should be paid to the types of criteria that could be 
adopted for distinguiShing elements giving rise to immunity from those givm, 
rise to non-immunity. 
13. It is understandable that the RaPPOrteur's treatment of non<antractuaI 
aspects finds justification in the existing dichotomy of the common Jaw 
between contract and tort. In civil law and Roman law treatment of obli-
gations and things, non<antractual aspects are simply too broad a perspective 
to be placed under one single category. The Rapporteur has referred to variOUl 
specified areas such as the right to property, the use of property, the pro-
tection of industrial property, personal injury, damage to property, succession 
to property and trust. The broad spectrum of .. non-contractual aspects II II 
not inaccurate but may tend to reduce the significance or true value of other 
branches of the law, such as State responsibility, international liability, capa-
city to acquire property rights, etc. It is therefore at best inadequate to 
Indicate a wide variety of residual areas outside the realm of contractuaI 
aspects. 
14. There may be more than one discussion of the distinction between 
immunity from juriSdiction and immunity from measures of enforcement. 
There is to begin with the time dimension in which the question of immu-
nity from jurisdiction must first be settled not only in the negative but also 
positively in the fonn of judgement debt or award before any question of 
measure of execution could be considered. In the second place, enforcement 
measure by way of execution presupposes the existence of property, movable 
or immovable within the jurisdiction of the State of the forum. Execution can 
only be levied against such property. Other enforcement measures such as 
specific perfonnance or injunction are not likely to be imposed as they seem 
inappropriate or unenforceable against a foreign State. 
Whatever the nature of distinction between immunity from jurisdiction 
and immunity from execution, the two immunities represent two succeedinl 
phases in the legal Proceedings. This does not preclude the possibility of 
seizure or attachment of property ad fundandam jurisdictionem or other typeS 
of sequestration or freezing of assets as security measures, which constitute 
pre-trial enforcement measures from which State immunity may also be 
invoked. Thus waiver of immunity from execution is also possible but as • 
separate act from waiver of immunity from jurisdiction. 
Immunity from adjudication is immunity from the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
It is an ordinary meaning ascribed to jurisdictional immunity, which in Its 
extended interpretation also covers immunity from the jurisdiction to seize or 
attach property as security or in execution of a judgement. The authority or 
agencies empowered to adjudicate are inVariably the judges or the courts 01' 
judicial authority, whereas the power to execute may be conferred in varIouS 
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c:ountrles on administrative authorities or executive agencies other than the 
judiciary or even the «police judiciaire,.. Such enforcement measures should 
be ordered or authorized by the courts. 
15. I do not disagree with the Rapporteur's provisional view that the immu-
nity II from execution II is essentially the same immunity as that II from juris-
diction fl. Indeed both are covered by the expression jurisdictional immunities. 
However, I beg to differ as regards considerations of principle and policy that 
are not necessarily identical in both cases. Consent to be sued is separate 
from and cannot be identified with consent to measures of execution. In fact, 
consent to execution per se is inadequate to allow enforcement measure to 
proceed. There must also be clearly identifiable assets or property against 
which execution is leviable with the consent of the foreign State. Here, 
opinions of government may differ as to the sacrosanctity or unattachability 
of certain types of public property such as military aircraft, man-of-war or 
military installations and facilities, funds of the central bank, which lie beyond 
the power of the territorial State to seize or detain, some say by presumption, 
others even by consent. To protect the interest of developing countries 
qainst the new frontier of enforcement measures which have recently been 
Idopted by the courts of highly advanced countries a rule of law is being 
progressively developed in the direction of prohibiting seizure or attachment 
of several types of State property, at any rate without the clear and unequivocal 
consent of the State. If it relates to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, even such consent may be insufficient. 
16. I would not approach the problem of general accounts as presented 
In the Philippines Embassy Case in the same manner as was adopted by the 
United States Court in the Tanzania Embassy Case, which resulted in the 
Interruption of the nonnal diplomatic relations, a decision which should be 
left to the discretion of the political branch of the government. A mixed 
account or general accounts of an embassy should never in any circumstances 
be presumed or construed to serve as deposit of payment to service future or 
pending adjudged debts. Too facile a presumption or imputation of consent 
would make a mockery of international law if not indeed of natural justice. 
National courts should not be tempted to perfonn miracles in areas where 
even international tribunals dare not enter. In the absence of practical mea-
sures of enforcement against States in the international legal order, it would 
Ieenl premature to suggest that municipal courts could enforce payments of 
debts or perfonnance of an obligation by a foreign State. 
17. My opinion of the provisions of Article III of the I.LA. Draft Convention 
dted in question No. 17 is consequential on my reply to the previous question. 
II it possible for municipal courts of a State to arrogate to themselves the 
SlOWer to decide questions of legality of a nationalization decree or the taking 
of property in violation of international law? How far can such unilateral 
decision have any effect in international relations; particularly, should the State 
of the forum assume the role of a judex in sua causa? There appear to be 
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countless considerations that militate against such a proposal. True It may be 
that it is about time some responsibility was assigned to national authoritiea 
of a State, but assuredly this is not an area where national adjudicatioD or 
enforcement could pave the way to international cooperation. Consent Is the 
key to the solution of aU pertinent questions. Without consent no enforcement 
measure should be encouraged, nor should consent ever be lightly Presumed 
or implied, when it comes to seizing or freezing or attaching property of a 
foreign State. The exception of property or assets earmarked for servicina 
of contractual debts or obligations arising out of commercial transactiODl 
should not be confused with property taken, whether or not there is or can 
ever be property taken in violation of international law, which surely belonp 
to a different chapter of international law. It should give no grounds for 
municipal courts unilaterally to purport to redress an alleged internationally 
wrongful act. Such a mandate should be reserved for international instances. 
Judicial, arbitral, conciliatory or otherwise. 
18. My view conforms with the general practice of States on the status 01 
poHtical subdivisions, including constituent units of federal States, and State 
instrumentalities. Political subdivisions may directly enjoy State lmmunitiea 
in their own names if so provided in the constituent instrument establishina 
the confederation, such as Switzerland and Brazil. Otherwise, they could act 
as organs of the government entitled to State immunity. The expression "State 
instrumentalities" is not new in American constitutional history, but difficult 
of translation into other European or Asian languages to be sufficiently 
meaningful. Do instrumentalities include warships, spacecraft, naval base, mili-
tary installations and embassy premises as well as other "instrumentlUfl 
legati "? If so, should the immunity accorded be one relating to the State u 
an international person or more precisely to the instrumentality as State pro-
perty rather than State organ or reprensentative of State? These are separate 
questions that require distinct clarifications. Political subdivisions are State 
organs or agencies rather than instrumentalities of government. 
19. I do not consider the separate incorporation of an entity as a 1epl 
person under municipal law to be automatically conclusive of the intent of the 
State to waive or renounce immunity. On the contrary, many States give legal 
personalities to their ministries and departments of government to provide 
them with necessary legal capacity to sue and be sued in their own courts. 
But when it comes to proceedings before the courts of another State, the 
capacity to sue and be sued still persists subject to the claim of State immu-
nity. It should be stated, however, that in the practice of some States, such 
as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, trading corporations are 
established precisely to engage in external commercial operations with ciear 
provision also in bilateral treaties waiving immunities in no uncertain termJ, 
not only immunity from jurisdiction but also from execution, by allocatiDi or 
setting aside bank accounts or assets for that very purpose. Yet in practice 
private litigants were not content with the solution so generously offered but 
---
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Itill sought to proceed directly against the foreign State eo nomine, hence the 
IOIlJ'ce of unnecessary misgivings. (See the Qureshi's Case in Pakistan Supreme 
Court.) 
20. N.B. 
A4ditional Comments: 
One of the most recent aspects of jurisdictional immunities is the law suit 
crisis now very current in the U.S.A., the U.K. and other industrially advanced 
countries. The cost of a law suit may be so exhorbitant and so prohibitive 
that to establish State or sovereign immunity alone may cost more than the 
total value of the claim against the foreign State. (See, e.g., Document 
No. AALCC/IM/83/1 Asian-African legal Consultative Committee, Meeting of 
LepI Advisers, New York, November 1983; and the House of Lords Judgment 
In Alcom Limited v. Colombia et AI. [1984] A.C. where Lord Dipplock said at 
page 725. regarding the cost incurred in the garnishee proceedings for the bank 
ICCOUDt of the Embassy of Colombia in London: "Those, to the discredit of 
our legal system, Your Lordships were told, already exceeded the amount of 
the judgment debt even be/ore the appeal reached this House. '') 
Sompong Sucharit1cul 
9. Observations of Mr Yuichi Takano 
Tokyo, July 1983 
&etion 1. 
State Immunity has lately attracted considerable attention from the Inter-
aational community. The main cause for this concern is deemed to be 
increasing opportunities for Nation States to participate in economic and com· 
mercial activities. 
States have traditionally been subjects of diplomatic, political and military 
relations on the international plane. Such relationships between States are in 
principle authoritative by nature, based on international agreements, or inter· 
national law in general. However, when States appear on the international 
ltage of economic and commercial activities, they are not necessarily acting as 
authoritative subjects, nor upon the basis of international agreements or inter-
national law in general. States today are known to frequently form economic 
and commercial relations in the same manner as private individuals or organi· 
zations and act on the contractual or municipal private law basis. 
When problems arise during the course of such State activities in the eco-
DOmic and commercial fields within the territory of other sovereign States, the 
question is raised whether States are subject to the jurisdiction of those terri-
